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Abstract—Cloud computing systems, in which clients rent and share computing resources of third party platforms, have gained
widespread use in recent years. Furthermore, cloud computing for mobile systems (i.e., systems in which the clients are
mobile devices) have too been receiving considerable attention in technical literature. We propose a new method of delegating
computations of resource-constrained mobile clients, in which multiple servers interact to construct an encrypted program known
as garbled circuit. Next, using garbled inputs from a mobile client, another server executes this garbled circuit and returns the
resulting garbled outputs. Our system assures privacy of the mobile client’s data, even if the executing server chooses to collude
with all but one of the other servers. We adapt the garbled circuit design of Beaver et al. and the secure multiparty computation
protocol of Goldreich et al. for the purpose of building a secure cloud computing for mobile systems. Our method incorporates
the novel use of the cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator of Blum et al. that enables the mobile client to
efficiently retrieve the result of the computation, as well as to verify that the evaluator actually performed the computation. We
analyze the server-side and client-side complexity of our system. Using real-world data, we evaluate our system for a privacy
preserving search application that locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client. We also measure the time taken to
construct and evaluate the garbled circuit for varying number of servers, demonstrating the feasibility of our secure and verifiable
cloud computing for mobile systems.
Index Terms—Secure Cloud Computing, Garbled Circuits, Secure Multiparty Computation
F
1 INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing systems, in which the clientsrent and share computing resources of third
party platforms such as Amazon Elastic Cloud, Mi-
crosoft Azure, etc., have gained widespread use in
recent years. Provisioned with a large pool of hard-
ware and software resources, these cloud computing
systems enable clients to perform computations on a
vast amount of data without setting up their own in-
frastructure [1]. However, providing the cloud service
provider with the client data in plaintext form to carry
out the computations will result in complete loss of
data privacy.
Homomorphic encryption [26] is an approach to
tackle the problem of preserving data privacy, which
can allow the cloud service providers to perform
specific computations directly on the encrypted client
data, without requiring private decryption keys. Re-
cently, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes
(e.g., Gentry et al. [13]) have been proposed, which
enable performing any arbitrary computation on en-
crypted data. However, FHE schemes are currently im-
practical for mobile cloud computing applications due to
extremely large cipher text size. For instance, to achieve
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128-bit security, the client is required to exchange a
few Giga bytes of ciphertext with the cloud server,
for each bit of the plain text message [13]. Thus, there
is a need for a more efficient alternative suitable for mobile
systems.
Yao’s garbled circuits approach [30], [31], which we
consider in our work, is a potential alternative to FHE
schemes that can drastically reduce the ciphertext size.
Any computation can be represented using a Boolean
circuit, for which, there exists a corresponding garbled
circuit [30], [31], [14], [15]. Each gate in a garbled
circuit can be unlocked using a pair of input wire
keys that correspond to the underlying plaintext bits;
and the association between the wire keys and the
plaintext bits is kept secret from the cloud server that
performs the computation. Unlocking a gate using
a pair of input wire keys reveals an output wire
key, which, in turn, serves as an input wire key for
unlocking the subsequent gate in the next level of
the circuit. Thus, garbled circuits can enable oblivious
evaluation of any arbitrary function, expressible as a
Boolean circuit, on a third-party cloud server.
While garbled circuits preserve the privacy of client
data, they are, however, one time programs – using
the same version of the circuit more than once com-
promises the garbled circuit and reveals to an adver-
sarial evaluator whether the semantics have changed
or remained the same for a set of input and output
wires between successive evaluations. Expecting the
client to create a new version of the garbled circuit for
each evaluation, however, is an unreasonable solution,
since creating a garbled circuit is at least as expensive
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as evaluating the underlying Boolean circuit! Thus,
in contrast to FHE schemes such as that of Gentry [13],
that can directly delegate the desired computation to the
cloud servers, a scheme using garbled circuits, presents the
additional challenge of efficiently delegating to the cloud
servers the creation of garbled circuit.
We propose a new method, in which whenever
the client needs to perform a computation, the client
employs a number of cloud servers to create a new
version of the garbled circuit in a distributed manner.
Each server generates a set of private input bits using
unique seed value from the client and interacts with
all the other servers to create a new garbled circuit,
which is a function of the private input bits of all
the servers. Essentially, the servers engage in a secure
multiparty computation protocol (e.g., Goldreich et
al. [14], [15]) to construct the desired garbled circuit
without revealing their private inputs to one another.
Once a new version of the garbled circuit is created
using multiple servers, the client delegates the evalu-
ation to an arbitrary server in the cloud. The resulting
version of the garbled circuit, the garbled inputs that
can unlock the circuit, and the corresponding garbled
outputs, remain unrecognizable to the evaluator, even
if it chooses to collude with any strict-subset of servers
that participated in the creation of the garbled circuit.
Our proposed system is designed to readily exploit
the real-world asymmetry that exists between typical
mobile clients and cloud servers – while the mobile
client-s are resource constrained, the cloud servers,
on the other hand, are sufficiently provisioned to
perform numerous intensive computation and com-
munication tasks. To achieve secure and verifiable
computing capability, our system requires very little
computation and communication involvement from
the mobile client beyond the generation and exchange
of compact cipher text messages. However, using signif-
icantly larger resources available to them, the cloud
servers can efficiently generate and exchange a large
volume of random bits necessary for carrying out the
delegated computation. Thus, our proposed scheme
is very suitable for mobile environments1.
We adapt the garbled circuit design of Beaver, Mi-
cali, Rogaway (BMR [3], [27]), and the secure multi-
party computation protocol of Goldreich et al. [14],
[15] to suit them for the purpose of building a secure
cloud computing system. To facilitate the construction
of the garbled circuit, and also to enable the client to
efficiently retrieve and verify the result of the computation,
our method incorporates the novel use of the crypto-
graphically secure pseudo random number generator
of Blum, Blum, Shub [5], [28], whose strength relies
on the computational difficulty of factorizing large
numbers into primes. Our proposed system enables the
1. While our proposed system is especially beneficial for clients
in a mobile environment, due to compact cipher text messages, it is
also suitable for clients in other environments that need to delegate
its computations to the cloud servers in a secure manner.
client to efficiently verify that the evaluator actually and
fully performed the requested computation.
Our major contributions in this work include the
following: (i) we design a secure mobile cloud com-
puting system using multiple servers that enables the
client to delegate any arbitrary computation, (ii) our
system assures the privacy of the client input and
the result of the computation, even if the evaluating
server colludes with all but one of the servers that
created the garbled circuit, (iii) our system enables the
client to efficiently retrieve/recover the result of the
computation and to verify whether the evaluator ac-
tually performed the computation, (iv) we present an
analysis of the server-side and client-side complexity
of our proposed scheme. Our findings show that in
comparison to Gentry’s FHE scheme, our scheme uses
very small cipher text messages suitable for mobile
clients, (v) using real-world data, we evaluate our
system for a privacy preserving search application
that locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile
client, and (vi) we measure the time taken to construct
and evaluate the garbled circuit for varying number
of servers, demonstrating the feasibility of our system.
2 A HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW OF OUR
SYSTEM
In the proposed system, the client employs a set
of (n + 2) servers, {p1, p2, . . . , pn, pc, pe}. Initially, the
client sends a description of the desired computation
(such as addition of two numbers, computation of
hamming distance between two bit sequences, etc.),
and a unique seed value si to each server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤
n). Each of these n servers first creates (or retrieves
from its repository, if available already) a Boolean
circuit (B) that corresponds to the requested compu-
tation. Using the unique seed value si, each server
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) generates a private pseudorandom
bit sequence whose length is proportional to the total
number of wires in the Boolean circuit (B). Then,
using the private pseudorandom bit sequences and
the Boolean circuit (B) as inputs, these n servers
interact with one another, while performing some
local computations, according to a secure multiparty
computation protocol, to create their shares (GCi, (1 ≤
i ≤ n)) for an one-time program called garbled circuit.
Once the shares for the garbled circuit are created,
the client requests each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), to
send its share, GCi, to the server pc. Performing an
XOR operation on these shares, the server pc creates
the desired circuit, GC = GC1 ⊕ GC2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ GCn.
Subsequently, the client instructs the server pc to
send the garbled circuit GC to another server pe for
evaluation.
Now, using the unique seed values si, (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
the client generates on its own garbled input values
for each input wire in the circuit and sends them to the
server pe for evaluation. Using these garbled inputs,
the server pe unlocks the gates in the first level of the
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Fig. 1. Our secure cloud computing model with (n +
2) = 5 servers. 1.) Client sends unique seed value, si,
to each pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ 3); 2.) p1, p2, p3 interact (Iij , 1 ≤ i <
j ≤ 3) to construct shares of the garbled circuit GC; 3.)
Each pi sends its share (GCi) to pc; 4.) pc computes
GC = GC1 ⊕GC2 ⊕GC3, and sends it to pe; 5.) Client
generates garbled inputs, and sends them to pe; 6.) pe
evaluates GC, and sends the garbled outputs to the
client.
circuit to obtain the corresponding garbled outputs,
which, in turn, unlocks the gates in the second level
of the circuit, and so on. In this manner, the server pe
unlocks all the gates in the circuit, obtains the garbled
outputs of the circuit, and sends them to the client.
The client now converts these garbled output values
into plaintext bits to recover the result of the desired
computation.
Fig. 1 depicts an overview of our secure cloud
computing system model with (n+ 2) = 5 servers.
2.1 Our Adversary Model
We assume the existence of a secure communication
channel between the client and each of the (n +
2) servers, {p1, p2, . . . , pn, pc, pe}, for sending unique
seed values for pseudorandom bit generation, identity
of the other servers, etc. We assume that all pairs of
communicating servers authenticate one another. We
assume a very capable adversary, where the evaluator
pe may individually collude with any proper subset of
the n servers, {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, and still remain unable
to determine the semantics of any garbled value that
the evaluator observes during evaluation. Thus, our
adversary model depicts a very realistic scenario –
where the client may be certain that some (however,
not all) of the parties are corrupt, however, it is uncer-
tain which of the parties are corrupt. If any adversarial
party attempts to eavesdrop and analyze the set of
all message exchanges between different parties, and
also analyze the set of all the messages that it has
legitimately received from the other parties, it still
cannot determine the shares of the other parties, or the
semantics of the garbled value pairs that are assigned
to each wire in the circuit. Further, if the evaluator, pe,
returns arbitrary numbers as outputs to the client, the
client can detect this efficiently. In our model, a new
garbled circuit is created for every evaluation. This
prevents an adversarial evaluator from determining
the set of inputs and outputs that have changed or
remained the same between different evaluations.
2.2 Main Characteristics of our system
We highlight some of the main features of our secure
cloud computing system in this subsection.
1) Offloaded Computation: The client delegates the
intensive computational tasks to the cloud
servers of creating and evaluating the garbled
circuit. The client only chooses the cloud servers,
provides them with unique seed values, gener-
ates garbled inputs during evaluation, and inter-
prets garbled outputs returned by the evaluator.
2) Compact cipher text: While Gentry’s scheme has
an extremely large cipher text size (on the order
of several Gigabits), the cipher text size can be
as small as a few hundred bits with our scheme,
as we have shown in Section ??. Thus, our
proposed method is far more practical for cloud
computing in mobile systems in comparison to
FHE schemes.
3) Decoupling: The process of creating the garbled
circuit is decoupled from the process of evaluat-
ing the garbled circuit. While the servers, pi, (1 ≤
i ≤ n), interact with one another for creating
the garbled circuit, the server pe evaluates the
garbled circuit, independently.
4) Precomputation of garbled circuits: Since evalua-
tion of the garbled circuit requires no inter-
action among the servers, if several versions
of the garbled circuit for a given computation
are precomputed and stored at the evaluator,
in advance, then it can readily carry out the
requested computation. Thus, the client will only
incur the relatively short time taken to evaluate the
garbled circuit. In other words, precomputation will
drastically improve the response time for the client.
5) Collusion Resistance: To interpret any garbled
value, the evaluator, pe, would need to collude
with all the n servers, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Thus, even
if (n − 1) out of the n servers are corrupt and
collude with the evaluator, the privacy of the
client’s inputs and the result of the computation
are still preserved.
6) Verification of outputs: The client has the ability
to verify that the evaluator actually carried out
the requested computation.
3 BACKGROUND
We briefly describe the construction and evaluation
of Yao’s garbled circuits [30], [31], as well as the
oblivious transfer protocols of Naor and Pinkas [24],
[25].
3.1 Yao’s Garbled Circuit
Each wire in the circuit is associated with a pair of
keys known as garbled values that correspond to the
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Fig. 2. A circuit with three gates, P,Q,R, and seven
wires, ωi, (0 ≤ i ≤ 6).
TABLE 1
Garbled Tables for Gates P,Q,R.
P Q R
Eω0
0
[Eω1
1
[ω14 ] Eω0
2
[Eω1
3
[ω05 ] Eω1
4
[Eω1
5
[ω06 ]
Eω0
0
[Eω0
1
[ω04 ] Eω1
2
[Eω0
3
[ω05 ] Eω0
4
[Eω0
5
[ω06 ]
Eω1
0
[Eω1
1
[ω14 ] Eω0
2
[Eω0
3
[ω05 ] Eω1
4
[Eω0
5
[ω16 ]
Eω1
0
[Eω0
1
[ω14 ] Eω1
2
[Eω1
3
[ω15 ] Eω0
4
[Eω1
5
[ω16 ]
underlying binary values. For example, the circuit
in Figure 2 has seven wires, ωi, (0 ≤ i ≤ 6), and
three gates, P,Q,R, denoting OR, AND, XOR gates
respectively. Keys ω0i , ω
1
i represent the garbled values
corresponding to binary values 0, 1 respectively on
the wire ωi.
Each gate in the circuit, is associated with a list
of four values, in a random order, known as garbled
table. Table 1 shows the garbled tables for the gates
P,Q,R of Fig. 2. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Let Ek[v] denote the
encryption of v using k as the key. Then, each entry
in the garble table for P is of the form, Eωx0 [Eωy1 [ω
x|y
4 ].
Similarly, each entry in the garble table for Q and R
are of the forms, Eωx2 [Eωy3 [ω
x.y
5 ] and Eωx4 [Eωy5 [ω
x⊕y
6 ],
respectively.
Suppose that the client wishes to delegate the com-
putation of Fig. 2, i.e., ((a|b)⊕ (c.d)), to a server in the
cloud. The server is provided with a description of the
circuit (Fig. 2) along with the set of the garbled tables
(Table 1), which together represents a garbled circuit.
However, the client keeps the mapping between the
garbled values and the underlying binary values as
secret. For example, to evaluate the circuit with inputs
a = 1, b = 0, c = 0, d = 1, the client provides the set of
garbled inputs, ω10 , ω01 , ω02 , ω13 , to the cloud server.
Now, assume that there exists a mechanism to
determine whether a value is decrypted correctly; for
example, through zero-padding. Using ω10 , ω01 as keys,
the server attempts to decrypt all the four entries in
the garbled table for gate P ; however, only the fourth
entry will decrypt correctly to reveal the garbled
output ω14 . Similarly, on using ω02 , ω13 as keys, the
first entry in the garbled table for gate Q reveals the
garbled output ω05 . Finally, on using ω14 , ω05 as keys,
the third entry in the garbled table for gate R reveals
the garbled output ω16 . Thus, the server can perform
an oblivious evaluation of the garbled circuit and return
the result of the computation ω16 to the client. Using
the secret mapping, the client can determine that the
garbled value ω16 corresponds to the binary value 1.
In our work, we use an alternative garbled circuit
design from Beaver, Micali, Rogaway (BMR [3], [27]),
and adapt it, as we describe in Section 4, for the
purpose of building a secure cloud computing system.
3.2 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
There are two parties, a sender and a chooser. The
sender holds two messages, M0,M1, and the chooser
holds a choice bit, σ ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the 1-
out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, the chooser
learns Mσ only, while the sender learns nothing.
Let p = 2q+ 1 denote a safe prime number; i.e., q is
also a prime number. Let Z∗p = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , (p− 1)},
which denotes the set of integers that are relatively
prime to p. Let G denote a subgroup of Z∗p , where
|G| = q. Let g denote the generator for G.
The sender randomly chooses an element, C ∈ G,
and sends it to the chooser. Note that the discrete log-
arithm of C is unknown to the chooser. The chooser
randomly selects an integer, k, (1 ≤ k ≤ q), and sets
PKσ = g
k mod p, and PK1−σ = C × (PKσ)−1 mod p.
The chooser sends PK0 to the sender. Note that PK0
does not reveal the choice bit σ to the sender.
The sender calculates PK1 = C×(PK0)−1 mod p on
its own, and randomly chooses two elements, r0, r1 ∈
G. Let h(x) denote the output of the hash function
(e.g., SHA) on input x. Let Ei denote the encryption
of Mi, ∀i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the sender calculates Ei =
[(gri mod p), (h(PKrii mod p) ⊕Mi)], and sends both
E0, E1 to the chooser.
The chooser decrypts Eσ to obtain Mσ as follows.
Let l1 = grσ mod p and l2 = h(PKrσσ mod p) ⊕Mσ
denote the first and second numbers respectively in
Eσ . The chooser calculates Mσ using the relation,
Mσ = h(l
k
1 mod p) ⊕ l2. Note that since the discrete
logarithm of C, and hence PK1−σ , is unknown to the
chooser, it cannot retrieve M1−σ from E1−σ .
3.3 1-out-of-4 Oblivious Transfer
There are two parties, a sender and a chooser. The
sender holds four messages, M00, M01, M10, M11, and
the chooser holds two choice bits, σ1, σ2. At the end
of the 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, the
chooser learns Mσ1σ2 only, while the sender learns
nothing.
The sender randomly generates two pairs of keys,
(L0, L1), (R0, R1), and computes the encryptions of
M00, M01, M10, M11 as follows. Let Fk(x) denote the
output of a pseudorandom function such as AES-
128, that is keyed using k on the input x. Let Eij
denote the encryption of Mij , ∀i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Then,
Eij = Mij ⊕ FLi(2i+ j + 1)⊕ FRj (2i+ j + 1).
The sender and the chooser engage in 1-out-of-2 OT
twice. In the first 1-out-of-2 OT, the sender holds two
messages, L0, L1, and the chooser holds the choice bit,
σ1; at the end of this OT, the chooser obtains Lσ1 .
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In the second 1-out-of-2 OT, the sender holds two
messages, R0, R1, and the chooser holds the choice
bit, σ2; at the end of this OT, the chooser obtains Rσ2 .
Now, the sender sends all the four encryptions, E00,
E01, E10, E11, to the chooser. Using Lσ1 , Rσ2 , the
chooser decrypts Eσ1σ2 to obtain Mσ1σ2 , as Mσ1σ2 =
Eσ1σ2 ⊕ FLσ1 (2σ1 + σ2 + 1)⊕ FRσ2 (2σ1 + σ2 + 1).
4 SECURE AND VERIFIABLE CLOUD COM-
PUTING FOR MOBILE SYSTEMS
In Section 4.1, we present the construction of BMR
garbled circuit [3], [27] using n servers through the
secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich
et al. [14], [15]. In Section 4.2, we highlight how
we adapt the protocol of Goldreich and the garbled
circuit design of BMR, in order to suit them for our
secure cloud computing model. In our model, each
server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), generates shares of garbled
values using cryptographically secure pseudorandom
number generation method of Blum, Blum, Shub [5],
[28]. In Section 4.3, we present our method of how the
client efficiently recovers the result of the delegated
computation, as well as how the client verifies that
the evaluator in fact carried out the computation.
We summarize our secure cloud computing model in
Section 4.4.
4.1 Construction and Evaluation of Garbled Cir-
cuits
4.1.1 Construction of the garbled circuit, GC
Garbled Value Pairs: Each wire in the circuit is associ-
ated with a pair of garbled values representing the
underlying plaintext bits 0 and 1. Let A denote a
specific gate in the circuit, whose two input wires
are x, y; and whose output wire is z. Let (α0, α1),
(β0, β1) and (γ0, γ1) denote the pair of garbled values
associated with the wires x, y and z, respectively.
Note that LSB(α0) = LSB(β0) = LSB(γ0) = 0 and
LSB(α1) = LSB(β1) = LSB(γ1) = 1.
Each garbled value is (nk + 1) bits long, where
n denotes the number of servers and k denotes the
security parameter. Essentially, each garbled value is
a concatenation of shares from the n servers. Let
a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}. Then the garbled values are expressed
as follows: αa = αa1||αa2||αa3|| . . . ||αan||a; βb =
βb1||βb2||βb3|| . . . ||βbn||b; γc = γc1||γc2||γc3|| . . . ||γcn||c;
where αai, βbi, γci are shares of server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
λ Value: Each wire in the circuit is also associated
with a 1-bit λ value that determines the semantics for
the pair of garbled values. Specifically, the garbled
value whose LSB = b represents the underlying
plaintext bit (b⊕ λ).
Collusion Resistance: Let λx, λy, λz denote the λ val-
ues for the wires x, y, z respectively. Then, λx =⊕n
i=1 λxi, λy =
⊕n
i=1 λyi, λz =
⊕n
i=1 λzi, where
λxi, λyi, λzi are shares of server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Note
that the λ value of each wire is unknown to any
individual server. Consequently, the evaluator of the
garbled circuit must collude with all the n servers to
interpret the garbled values.
Garbled Table: Each gate, A, in the circuit, is
associated with an ordered list of four values,
[A00, A01, A10, A11], which represents the garbled table
for gate A. Let ⊗ ∈ {XOR,AND} denote the binary
operation of gate A. Then, the value of one specific en-
try, Aab = γ[((λx⊕a)⊗(λy⊕b))⊕λz ]⊕ [Gb(αa1)⊕Gb(αa2)⊕
. . . ⊕ Gb(αan)] ⊕ [Ga(βb1) ⊕ Ga(βb2) ⊕ . . . ⊕ Ga(βbn)],
where Ga and Gb are pseudorandom functions that
expand k bits into (nk+ 1) bits. Specifically, let G de-
note a pseudorandom generator, which on providing
a k-bit input seed, outputs a sequence of (2nk+2) bits,
i.e., if |s| = k, then |G(s)| = (2nk+2). G may represent
the output of AES block cipher in output feedback
mode, for example. Then, G0(s) and G1(s) denote the
first and last (nk + 1) bits of G(s) respectively.
To compute a garbled table entry Aab, such as
the one shown above, the n servers use the secure
multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich [14],
[15] (Section 4.1.2), where f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = Aab, and
for each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), its private input,
xi = [λxi, λyi, λzi, Gb(αai), Ga(βbi), γ0i, γ1i] is a vector
of length m = (3+2(nk+1)+2k) bits. In this manner,
the n servers jointly compute each entry in the garbled
table for each gate in the circuit.
4.1.2 Secure multiparty computation of an entry, Aab
Assume that n parties need to compute the value
of an arbitrary function of their private inputs,
namely f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) without revealing their pri-
vate inputs to one another. Assume that the function
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is expressed as a Boolean circuit (B′)2
using a set of XOR and AND gates.
We briefly describe the secure multipary computa-
tion protocol of Goldreich [14], [15] as follows. For
each wire in the Boolean circuit, the actual binary
value corresponds to the XOR-sum of shares of all
the n parties.
Evaluation of each XOR gate in the circuit is carried
out locally. Specifically, each party merely performs an
XOR operation over its shares for the two input wires
to obtain its share for the output wire.
Evaluation of each AND gate in the circuit, on the
other hand, requires communication between all pairs
of parties. For the two inputs wires to the AND gate,
let ai, bi denote the shares of party pi; and let aj , bj
denote the shares of party pj . Then, the XOR-sum of
the shares for the output wire of the AND gate is
expressed as follows:
2. Boolean circuit B′ is different from Boolean circuit B. While
B is a circuit that corresponds to the computation requested by the
client (e.g., addition of two numbers), B′ is a circuit that creates
the entries such as Aab in the garbled tables of the garbled circuit
GC.
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(
⊕n
i=1 ai).(
⊕n
i=1 bi) = [
⊕
1≤i<j≤n((ai⊕aj).(bi⊕bj))]⊕n
i=1((ai.bi).I), where I = n mod 2.
Each party pi locally computes ((ai.bi).I); and the
computation of each partial-product, ((ai⊕aj).(bi⊕bj)),
is accomplished using 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer
(OT) between pi and pj , such that no party reveals
its shares to the other party [14], [15].
Following the above procedure, the n parties
evaluate every gate in the circuit. Thus, in the
end, for the BMR protocol, as we have described
above, each server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), obtains
the share, (f(x1, x2, . . . , xn))i = (Aab)i, such that
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = Aab =
⊕n
i=1(Aab)i.
4.1.3 Evaluation of the garbled circuit, GC
The garbled table for each gate, A, in the circuit is an
ordered list of four values, [A00, A01, A10, A11].
Let α, β denote the garbled values for the two input
wires of a gate during evaluation. Let a, b denote
the LSB values of α, β respectively. Then, the gar-
bled value for the output wire, γ, is recovered using
α, β,Aab, as shown in the two-step process below:
1) split the most significant nk bits of α into n
parts, α1, α2, α3, . . . , αn, each with k bits; simi-
larly, split the most significant nk bits of β into
n parts, β1, β2, β3, . . . , βn, each with k bits; i.e.,
|αi| = |βi| = k, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2) compute γ = [Gb(α1)⊕Gb(α2)⊕ . . .⊕Gb(αn)]
⊕ [Ga(β1)⊕Ga(β2)⊕ . . .⊕Ga(βn)]⊕Aab.
Thus, the garbled output for any gate in the circuit
can be computed using the garbled table and the
two garbled inputs to the gate. Note that while the
construction of the garbled circuit requires interaction
among all the n parties, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the server pe
can perform the evaluation independently.
4.2 Secure and Verifiable Cloud Computing
through Secure Multiparty Computation
In a secure multiparty computation protocol, multiple
parties hold private inputs, and receive the result of
the computation. However, in our proposed secure
cloud computing system, while multiple parties par-
ticipate in the creation of garbled circuits, only the
client holds private inputs and obtains the result of
the computation in garbled form. Therefore, we adapt
the protocols of Goldreich and BMR in a number of ways,
as we discuss in this section, to build an efficient, secure
cloud computing system, that also enables the client to
easily verify the outputs of the computation.
First, note that in the protocol of Goldre-
ich [14], [15], each party pi sends its share
(f(x1, x2, . . . , xn))i to all the other parties. Using
these shares, each party computes f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) as⊕n
i=1(f(x1, x2, . . . , xn))i. In our secure cloud comput-
ing system, however, we require each server pi, (1 ≤
i ≤ n), to send its share to only one server, pc, which
combines them using the XOR operation to produce
entries such as Aab for each garbled table in the
garbled circuit, GC.
Second, in the BMR protocol [3], [27], which is
also a secure multiparty computation protocol, in
addition to creating the garbled circuit, for evaluation,
the n parties also create garbled inputs using secure
multiparty computation. Then, each of these n parties
evaluates the garbled circuit and obtains the result of the
computation. In our system model, since only the client
holds the inputs for the computation, it generates the
corresponding garbled input for each input wire on
its own using the seed values it sends to each server,
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then, it sends these garbled values to
server pe for evaluating the garbled circuit and obtains
the result in garbled form. Note that in our model,
only the server pe evaluates the garbled circuit, and that
pe cannot interpret any garbled value, unless it colludes
with all the n servers, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Third, in the BMR protocol [3], [27], the λ value is
set to zero for each output wire in the Boolean circuit.
Therefore, each party evaluating the garbled circuit
obtains the result of the computation in plaintext form
from the LSB of the garbled output for each output
wire in the circuit. In our system model, however,
the λ value for each output wire is also determined
using the XOR-sum of the shares from all the n
servers, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). As a consequence, result of the
computation in plaintext form remains as secret for the
evaluator pe.
Fourth, in the protocol of Goldreich [14], [15], each
party splits and shares each of its private input
bits with all the other parties over pairwise secure
communication channels. In our approach, we elimi-
nate this communication using a unique seed value
sik that the client shares with all pairs of parties,
(pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n). To split and share each of its m
private input bits xij , (1 ≤ j ≤ m), party pi generates
rkj , (∀k 6= i), using the seed value sik. More specifi-
cally, party pi sets its own share as xij
⊕n
k=1,k 6=i rkj ,
where rkj = R(sik, j, gateid, entryid) corresponds to
the output of the pseudorandom bit generator using
the seed value sik for the jth private input bit of party
pi, for a specific garbled table entry (entryid) of one
of the gates (gateid) in the circuit. Likewise, party pk
sets its own share as rkj = R(sik, j, gateid, entryid).
The total number of pseudorandom bits generated
by each party for the protocol of Goldreich equals
2(n − 1)m × 4Ng = 8(n − 1)m × Ng , where m =
(3 + 2(nk+ 1) + 2k), and Ng denotes the total number
of gates in the circuit. In other words, our approach
eliminates the exchange of a very large number of bits
(O(n3kNg) bits) between the n parties.
Fifth, our novel use of the Blum, Blum, Shub pseu-
dorandom number generator for generating garbled
value shares enables the client to efficiently recover and
verify the outputs of the computation. The client can
detect a cheating evaluator, if it returns arbitrary values
as output. We present this in a greater detail in
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Section 4.3.
4.3 Recovery and Verification of Outputs
We address the following questions in this subsection.
First, how does the client efficiently retrieve/recover the
result of the computation without itself having to repeat the
delegated computations? Second, how does the client verify
that the evaluator, in fact, evaluated the garbled circuit?
In other words, is it possible for the client to determine
whether the evaluator returned arbitrary numbers without
carrying out any computation at all, instead of the actual
garbled output for each output wire?
We can enable the client to efficiently retrieve and
verify the outputs returned by the evaluator, pe. To
achieve this, each of the n parties that participates
in the creation of the garbled circuit uses the crypto-
graphically secure Blum, Blum, Shub pseudorandom
number generator [5], [28], as we have outlined below.
Let N denote the product of two large prime num-
bers, p, q, which are congruent to 3 mod 4. The client
chooses a set of n seed values, {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, where
each seed value si belongs to Z∗N , the set of integers
relatively prime to N . The client sends the modulus
value N and a unique seed value si to each party
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) over a secure communication channel.
However, the client keeps the prime factors, p, q, of N
as a secret.
Let bi,j denote the jth bit generated by the party pi.
Then, bi,j = LSB(xi,j), where xi,j = x2i,(j−1) mod N ,
and xi,0 = si.
Each wire ω in the circuit is associated with a
pair of garbled values, (ω0, ω1), and a 1-bit λω
value. Then, ω0 = ω01||ω02||ω03|| . . . ||ω0n||0, ω1 =
ω11||ω12||ω13|| . . . ||
ω1n||1; and λω = λω1 ⊕ λω2 ⊕ λω3 ⊕ . . .⊕ λωn. In these
three expressions, ω0i, ω1i and λωi are shares of the
party pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Note that |ω0i| = |ω1i| = k, and
|λωi| = 1.
For each wire ω, (0 ≤ ω ≤W−1), in the circuit, each
party, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), needs to generate (2k+1) pseudo
random bits, where W denotes the total number of
wires in the circuit. Thus, each party, pi, generates a
total of (W (2k + 1)) pseudorandom bits.
Party pi generates its shares ω0i, ω1i, and λωi for
wire ω as a concatenation of the bi,j values, where the
indices j belong to the range: [(ω(2k + 1) + 1), (ω +
1)(2k + 1)]. For concise notation, let Ωωk = ω(2k + 1).
Then,
ω0i = bi,(Ωωk+1)||bi,(Ωωk+2)|| . . . ||bi,(Ωωk+k),
ω1i = bi,(Ωωk+k+1)||bi,(Ωωk+k+2)|| . . . ||bi,(Ωωk+2k),
λωi = bi,(Ωωk+2k+1).
Short-cut: Notice that each party pi is required to
compute all the previous (j − 1) bits before it can
compute the jth bit. However, using its knowledge of
the prime factors of N , i.e., p, q, the client can directly
calculate any xi,j (hence, the bit bi,j) using the relation:
xi,j = x
2j mod C(N)
i,0 mod N , where C(N) denotes the
Carmichael function, which equals the least common
multiple of (p− 1) and (q − 1).
Therefore, using the secret values p, q, the client can read-
ily compute ω0, ω1, and λω for any output wire ω in the
circuit; i.e., without having to compute ω0, ω1, and λω for
any intermediate wire in the circuit. Using the λω values
for the output wires, the client can translate each of the
garbled values returned by the evaluator pe into a plaintext
bit and recover the result of the requested computation.
The client declares successful output verification only if
the garbled output returned by the evaluator matches with
either ω0 or ω1, for each output wire ω of the circuit.
Collusion Resistance: Note that, without performing
any computation, the evaluator can return one of the
two actual garbled outputs for each output wire in the
circuit, if and only if it colludes with all the n servers,
{p1, p2, . . . , pn}, that participated in the creation of the
garbled circuit, or factorizes N into its prime factors,
p and q, which is infeasible.
Unpredictability: Further, the Blum, Blum, Shub
pseudorandom number generator guarantees that one
cannot predict the next/previous bit output from the
generator, even with the knowledge of all the previ-
ous/future bits [5], [28]. Thus, based on the obser-
vations of the garbled values during evaluation, the
evaluator cannot predict the preceding or subsequent
garbled values, or the λ values for any wire in the
circuit.
4.4 Summary of our Proposed System
We summarize our secure cloud computing model in
this subsection.
1) The client chooses a set of (n+ 2) servers in the
cloud, {p1, p2, . . . , pn, pc, pe}. Then, it provides a
description of the desired computation, and a
unique seed value si to each server pi, (1 ≤ i ≤
n). It also provides another seed value sik to
each pair of servers, (pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n).
2) Each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), creates (or re-
trieves from its repository, if already available)
a Boolean circuit (B) that corresponds to the
requested computation.
3) Each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), uses si to generate
its shares for the pair of garbled values and a λ
value for each wire in the circuit (B) using the
pseudo random generator of Blum, Blum, Shub.
Using seed si, each server, pi, generates a pseu-
dorandom bit sequence whose length equals
W (2k + 1), where W denotes the total number
of wires in the Boolean circuit (B).
4) The client instructs the n servers, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤
n), to use their shares as private inputs for
the secure multiparty computation protocol of
Goldreich, to construct shares (GCi) of a BMR
garbled circuit, GC.
While using the protocol of Goldreich, each pair
of servers, (pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n), generates
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pseudorandom bits using pairwise seed values
sik.
Let Ai = (A00)i||(A01)i||(A10)i||(A11)i denote the
shares of server pi for the four garbled table
entries of gate A. Then, GCi, in turn, is a con-
catenation of all bit strings of the form Ai, where
the concatenation is taken over all the gates in
the circuit.
5) The client instructs all n servers, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤
n) to send their shares GCi to the server pc.
Performing only XOR operations, the server pc
creates the desired circuit, GC = GC1 ⊕ GC2 ⊕
. . .⊕GCn. Now, the client instructs the server pc
to send the garbled circuit GC to server pe for
evaluation.
6) Using the unique seed values si, (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
the client generates garbled input values for each
input wire in the circuit, and sends them to the
server pe for evaluation. Using these seed values,
the client also generates the λ values and the two
possible garbled values for each output wire in
the circuit, and keeps them secret.
7) Using the garbled inputs, the server pe evaluates
GC, and obtains the garbled outputs for each
output wire in the circuit and sends them to the
client. Using the λ values, the client now trans-
lates these garbled values into plaintext bits to
recover the result of the requested computation.
8) The client checks whether the garbled output for
each output wire in the circuit that is returned
by the evaluator, pe, matches with one of the
two possible garbled values that it computed on
its own. If there is a match for all output wires,
then the client declares that the evaluator in fact
carried out the requested computation.
5 COMPLEXITY
5.1 Circuit size of one garbled table entry
In this section, we analyze the size of the Boolean
circuit (B′) that computes one specific entry (Aab) in
the garbled table. Assume that each gate takes two
input bits to produce one output bit. Recall from Sec-
tion 4.1.1 that Aab = γ[((λx⊕a)⊗(λy⊕b))⊕λz ]⊕ [Gb(αa1)⊕
Gb(αa2)⊕ . . .⊕Gb(αan)]⊕ [Ga(βb1)⊕Ga(βb2)⊕ . . .⊕
Ga(βbn)], where ⊗ ∈ {XOR,AND} denotes the bi-
nary operation of gate A.
Let s = ((λx ⊕ a) ⊗ (λy ⊕ b)) ⊕ λz . Computing
s requires a total of 3 + 3(n − 1) = 3n XOR gates
and 1 ⊗ gate, since λx =
⊕n
i=1 λxi, λy =
⊕n
i=1 λyi,
λz =
⊕n
i=1 λzi, where λxi, λyi, λzi are shares of server
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Boolean circuit B′ includes a multiplexer that
chooses γs using the expression, γs = ((γ0⊕γ1).s)⊕γ0.
This expression is composed of 2 XOR gates and 1
AND gate. Since |γ0| = |γ1| = nk+1, and LSB(γs) = s,
multiplexing is performed on the most significant nk
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Fig. 3. Number of gates in the circuit that computes
one garbled table entry as a function of n.
bits. We can build this multiplexer using a total of 2nk
XOR gates and nk AND gates.
Now, the expression γs⊕ [Gb(αa1)⊕Gb(αa2)⊕ . . .⊕
Gb(αan)] ⊕ [Ga(βb1) ⊕ Ga(βb2) ⊕ . . . ⊕ Ga(βbn)] has
(2n + 1) terms, which are combined using 2n XOR
operations. Since, each term has a length of (nk + 1)
bits, computing this expression requires a total of
2n(nk + 1) XOR gates.
To summarize, the Boolean circuit (B′) that com-
putes one specific garbled table entry (Aab) has a total
of (3n+ 2nk+ 2n(nk+ 1)) XOR gates, nk AND gates,
and 1 ⊗ gate.
Fig. 3 shows the total number of gates in the circuit
that computes Aab, when A is an AND gate, as a
function of n for a fixed value of k = 128 bits.
Notice the relatively small number of AND gates in
the circuit. For example, when n = 6, the circuit
that computes Aab has a total of 10782 XOR and 769
AND gates. While the number of XOR gates increases
quadratically with n, the number of AND gates increases
only linearly with n.
Let B denote the Boolean circuit that corresponds
to the desired computation such as addition of two
numbers. Then, while creating the garbled circuit GC
for B, the n parties use the circuit B′ for the protocol
of Goldreich to compute each one of the four garbled
table entries of the form Aab for each gate A in the
circuit B.
5.2 Communication cost to compute one garbled
table entry
A 1-out-of-2 OT exchange between two parties in-
volves the exchange of: (i) a random element C from
the prime order subgroup, G, of Z∗p ; (ii) a public
key, PK0; and (iii) the encryptions, E0, E1, of the
plaintext messages M0,M1. Let k denote the security
parameter, which equals the size of the plaintext
messages, M0,M1. Let s1:2 denote the total number of
bits that are exchanged during a 1-out-of-2 OT. Then,
s1:2 = |C|+ |PK0|+ |E0|+ |E1| = |p|+ |p|+ (|p|+ k) +
(|p|+ k) = 4|p|+ 2k.
A 1-out-of-4 OT exchange between two parties in-
cludes: (i) two 1-out-of-2 OTs, and (ii) four encryp-
tions, E00, E01, E10, E11. Let s1:4 denote the total num-
ber of bits that are exchanged during a 1-out-of-4 OT.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CLOUD COMPUTING, VOL. X, NO. X, JANUARY 20XX 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
N
et
w
or
k 
tra
ffi
c 
to
 c
om
pu
te
 o
ne
 g
ar
bl
ed
ta
bl
e 
en
try
 (m
eg
a b
yte
s)
Number of parties (n)
Fig. 4. Amount of network traffic to compute one
garbled table entry as a function of n.
Then, s1:4 = 2(s1:2)+4k = 8(|p|+k). Note that |p| and
k are public and symmetric key security parameters,
respectively. For example, |p| = 3072 achieves the
equivalent of k = 128-bit security [2]; in this case, the
sum of the sizes of all messages exchanged during a
1-out-of-4 OT is s1:4 = 3200 bytes.
For each AND gate in the circuit B′, all possible
pairs of the n servers, (pi, pj), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, engage
in a 1-out-of-4 OT, and there are a total of n(n− 1)/2
combinations of (pi, pj). Since the number of AND
gates in the circuit B′ is at most (nk + 1), the total
number of 1-out-of-4 OTs is t1:4 = (nk+1)×n(n−1)/2.
At the completion of the secure multiparty com-
putation protocol of Goldreich, each server, pi, (1 ≤
i ≤ n), sends its share (Aab)i to another server, pc,
to create the desired garbled table entry, Aab. Since
|(Aab)i| = nk + 1, the server pc receives a total of
s? = n(nk + 1) bits from the other n servers.
To summarize, in order to create one entry, Aab, the
total amount of network traffic, T = (t1:4×s1:4)+s? =
(nk + 1)[(4(|p|+ k)× n(n− 1)) + n]. When the security
parameters, k and |p|, are fixed, the network traffic is a
cubic function of n.
Fig. 4 shows the network traffic to create one gar-
bled table entry as a function of n. For example, when
n = 5, the cloud servers exchange a total of 19.56 MB
of data in order to create a single entry in the garbled
table.
Let Ng denote the total number of gates in the
circuit B that corresponds to the desired computa-
tion. Then, in the process of creating the garbled
circuit, GC, the total amount of network traffic equals
4Ng × T .
5.3 Computation cost of creating the garbled cir-
cuit
Let W denote the total number of wires in the circuit
B. For each wire, each server, pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), generates
(2k+ 1) bits using the Blum, Blum, Shub (BBS) pseu-
dorandom number generator (PRNG) for its share
of garbled values and the λ value. Therefore, the n
servers collectively generate a total of b1 = n(2k+1)W
bits using the BBS PRNG. Let N denote the modulus
value in BBS PRNG (note: |N | = 3072 achieves 128-bit
security [2]). Then, n(2k+1)W modular multiplication
operations in Z∗N are necessary to generate bits using
BBS PRNG.
Let Wo denote the number of output wires in the
circuit B. Let G denote the PRNG, which we have
described in Section 4.1.3, that outputs a sequence of
(2nk + 2) bits on providing a k-bit input seed. Each
server uses the PRNG G, on its share of each garbled
value for every non-output wire in the circuit B. Then,
in the process of creating the garbled circuit, the n
servers collectively use the PRNG G, 2n(W − Wo)
times to generate a total of b2 = 4n(nk + 1)(W −Wo)
bits.
Let Ng denote the total number of gates in the cir-
cuit B. For protocol of Goldreich, the total number of
pseudorandom bits generated by each party using the
PRNG R, equals 8(n−1)m×Ng , where m = (3+2(nk+
1) + 2k) (Section 4.2). Thus, the n parties collectively
generate a total of b3 = 8n(n−1)(3+2(nk+1)+2k)×Ng
bits using the PRNG R.
Note that both the PRNG G and PRNG R can be
realized using a block cipher such as AES operating
in output feedback mode.
Let t1:4 denote the number of 1-out-of-4 OTs to
create one garbled table entry (Section 5.2). Then, the
total number of 1-out-of-4 OTs to create the complete
garbled circuit GC is at most 4Ng× t1:4 = 4Ng× (nk+
1)× n(n− 1)/2.
During a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, the sender
and chooser generate a total of |C| + |k| + |r0| +
|r1| = (4|p|−1) bits. Each 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer
involves the cost of two 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers,
in addition to generating a total of |L0|+ |L1|+ |R0|+
|R1| = 4k bits. A very small constant number of modular
arithmetic operations, AES and SHA crypto operations are
carried out during each OT (Section 3.2 and Section 3.3).
While creating the garbled circuit GC, these sets of
operations are performed 4Ng × (nk+ 1)× n(n− 1)/2
times; and a total of b4 = 4Ng × (nk + 1) × (n(n −
1)/2) × (8|p| + 4k − 2) bits are generated during the
OTs.
To summarize, the total number of bits that are
generated by the n parties while creating the garbled
circuit is b = b1 +b2 +b3 +b4 = (n(2k+1)W )+(4n(nk+
1)(W−Wo))+(8n(n−1)(3+2(nk+1)+2k)×Ng)+(4Ng×
(nk+ 1)× (n(n− 1)/2)× (8|p|+ 4k− 2)). Thus, for any
given Boolean circuit, when the security parameters k and
|p| are fixed, the total number of bits generated randomly
is a cubic function of n.
For example, consider the construction of a garbled
circuit for adding two 32-bit numbers. The corre-
sponding Boolean circuit has a total of W = 439 wires,
Wo = 33 output wires, and Ng = 375 gates3. Fig. 5
shows the total number of Mbits that are generated
randomly while creating one garbled table entry (i.e.,
3. The 32-bit adder circuit in [29] has 127 AND gates, 61 XOR
gates and 187 NOT gates. Note that a NOT gate is equivalent to
an XOR gate, since NOT(x) = (1⊕ x).
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CLOUD COMPUTING, VOL. X, NO. X, JANUARY 20XX 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
101
102
103
N
um
be
r o
f M
eg
a 
bi
ts
 g
en
er
at
ed
 ra
nd
om
ly
to
 c
on
st
ru
ct
 o
ne
 g
ar
bl
ed
 ta
bl
e 
en
try
Number of parties (n)
Fig. 5. Total number of Mega bits that are generated
randomly in the process of creating one garbled table
entry for the 32-bit adder.
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Fig. 6. Size of the garbled circuit in kilo bits for the
32-bit adder.
b/(4Ng × 220)) for the 32-bit adder. As an example,
when n = 5, these parties collectively generate a total
of 153.41 Mbits, randomly, to create one garbled table
entry.
5.4 Cost of evaluating the garbled circuit
In order to perform the requested computation, the
server pe obtains the garbled circuit, GC, from the
server pc. Let Ng denote the total number of gates
in the circuit B. Each entry in the garbled table has
a length of (nk + 1) bits. Therefore, the size of the
garbled circuit equals 4Ng × (nk + 1) bits.
Fig. 6 shows the size of the garbled circuit in kilo
bits for the 32-bit adder. This circuit has Ng = 375
gates. The security parameter k = 128.
Let W and Wo denote the total number of wires
and output wires, respectively, in the Boolean circuit
B. During evaluation, for each non-output wire of
the circuit, the server pe uses the PRNG G n times.
Therefore, G is used for a total of (W −Wo)n times.
5.5 Cost for the client
To enable the creation of the garbled circuit, the client
provides: (i) a unique seed value, si, to each server
pi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and (ii) a seed value, sik, to each pair
of servers (pi, pk), (1 ≤ i, k ≤ n).
For the BBS PRNG, the length of each seed value,
|si| = |N |. For the PRNG R, which can be imple-
mented using a block cipher such as AES in output
feedback mode, the length of each seed is |sik| = k.
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ates to delegate the construction and evaluation of the
garbled circuit, and to verify the outputs for the 32-bit
adder.
Therefore, the total number of bits that the client
exchanges for the seed values is bs = n|N | + n(n −
1)k = n(|N |+ (n− 1)k).
For each plaintext input bit to the circuit, the client
is required to generate the garbled input. Each garbled
value is (nk + 1) bits long, whose least significant bit
depends on the λ value. Since the λ value, in turn,
depends on the 1-bit shares for the n parties, the
number of bits that the client needs to generate for
each input wire equals bi = (nk + n).
To enable verification of outputs, the client needs
to generate both possible garbled outputs for each
output wire. Therefore, the number of bits that the
client needs to generate for each output wire equals
bo = (2nk + n).
To summarize, the client generates/exchanges a
total of bs + Wi × bi + Wo × bo = n[|N | + (n − 1)k +
Wi(k+1)+Wo(2k+1)] bits, where Wi and Wo denote
the number of input and output wires, respectively,
in the Boolean circuit B.
Fig. 7 shows the total number of kilo bits that
the client generates in order to enable the servers to
construct and evaluate the garbled circuit, as well as
for the verification of outputs for the 32-bit adder.
This circuit has Wi = 64 input wires and Wo = 33
output wires. The security parameters are k = 128
and |N | = 3072.
Comparing Fig. 7 with Figs. 4 and Fig. 5, we
notice that while the servers generate and exchange
Gigabytes of information to create the garbled circuit,
the mobile client, on the other hand, generates and
exchanges only kilobytes of information with the eval-
uator and the other servers.
5.6 Comparison of Our Scheme with Gentry’s
FHE Scheme
While Gentry’s FHE scheme [13] uses only one server,
it, however, requires the client to exchange O(k5) bits
with the evaluating server, for each input and output
wire of the circuit. In our secure cloud computing
system, since each garbled value has a length of
(nk+1) bits, for each input and output wire, the client
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Fig. 9. Time to evaluate one garbled gate.
only exchanges O(nk) bits with the server pe. For ex-
ample, with k = 128, the size of each encrypted plain
text bit equals several Gigabits with Gentry’s scheme,
while it equals a mere 641 bits in our approach with
n = 5. Thus, our approach is far more practical for
cloud computing in mobile systems in comparison to FHE
schemes.
5.7 Construction and evaluation time
We implemented our secure cloud computing system
using BIGNUM routines and crypto functions from
the OpenSSL library. We built our system as a collec-
tion of modules, and the servers communicate using
TCP sockets. We evaluated our system on a server
with Intel Xeon 2.53 GHz processor, with 6 cores and
32 GB RAM 4. Fig. 8 shows the time taken to construct
one garbled table as a function of n. We note that the
garbled tables for any number of gates in the circuit can be
constructed in parallel, which will significantly reduce the
construction time.
Fig. 9 shows the time taken to evaluate one garbled
gate as a function of n. Comparing Fig. 8 and Fig. 9,
we observe that evaluation is significantly faster than
construction, where the latter can be done offline. If the
garbled circuits are pre-computed, and made available
to the evaluator, in advance, it can readily carry out
the requested computation, and therefore, drastically
reduce the response time for the mobile client.
4. We thank Srinivasa Vamsi Laxman Perala (email:
sxp136630@utdallas.edu) for implementing various components of
our system.
TABLE 2
Locations of Banks and ATMs in Salt Lake City, UT
(source: www.chase.com, www.wellsfargo.com).
Bank/ATM Location
Chase 201 South 0 East
Chase 185 South 100 East
Chase 376 East 400 South
Chase 531 East 400 South
Wells Fargo 299 South 0 East
Wells Fargo 381 East 300 South
Wells Fargo 79 South 0 East
Wells Fargo 778 South 0 East
Wells Fargo 570 South 700 East
Wells Fargo 235 South 1300 East
6 PRIVACY PRESERVING SEARCH FOR THE
NEAREST BANK/ATM
We examine the following privacy preserving applica-
tion in this section. A mobile client, which is located
at the intersection of two streets, needs to determine
the location of the nearest Chase or Wells Fargo bank
or ATM machine in a privacy preserving manner.
We evaluate our application using real-world data
available for Salt Lake City, UT, whose streets are
arranged in a grid pattern. Our application assures
the privacy of the following – (i) the mobile client’s
input location, (ii) the computed bank/ATM location
nearest to the client, and (iii) the computed distance to
the nearest ATM. Note that these secrets are revealed
to the evaluator only if it colludes with all the n
servers that participate in the creation of the garbled
circuit.
We consider an area of Salt Lake City, UT that lies
between Main street (which represents 0 East street),
1300 East street, South Temple street (which represents
0 South street), and 800 South street. This area consists
of L = 10 ATM locations that are shown in Table 2.
Each East/South coordinate in this area is an l =
max(dlog21300e, dlog2800e) = 11-bit unsigned num-
ber. Therefore, the location of the mobile client at an
intersection, or any bank/ATM in this area can be
identified using Lind = 2l = 22 bits.
6.1 Circuit for Computing Manhattan Distance
Let (xa, ya) represent the coordinates of the mobile
client at an intersection. Similarly, let (xb, yb) represent
the coordinates of a bank/ATM. Since the streets are
arranged in a grid pattern, the shortest distance (D)
between (xa, ya) and (xb, yb) equals the sum of the ab-
solute differences between the respective coordinates:
D = |xa − xb|+ |ya − yb|. This distance metric is more
commonly referred to as the Manhattan distance.
We design a Boolean circuit for computing the
Manhattan distance between two points, (xa, ya) and
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Fig. 10. Absolute difference between the X and Y
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Fig. 11. Manhattan Distance Computation.
(xb, yb). Assume that each coordinate is an l bit un-
signed number. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the
block diagram of our circuit. We use the SUB and
ADD blocks of Kolesnikov et al. [19].
Each SUB/ADD block is composed of l 1-bit sub-
tractors/adders; each 1-bit subtractor/adder, in turn,
is composed of 4 XOR gates, 1 AND gate. Note that
(l + 1)th output bit of SUB block equals the comple-
ment of carry-out bit from the lth 1-bit subtractor.
If xa ≥ xb, then the output of SUB block equals the
absolute difference, |xa−xb|. Otherwise, the output of
SUB block equals the negative value, −|xa−xb|, in 2′s
complement form. Since xl+1 = 1 for negative values,
we use xl+1 as one of the inputs for the XOR gates in
the INV block to compute the 1′s complement of the
absolute difference. Then, we subsequently use xl+1
as a carry-in input bit for the ADD block. Thus, the
output of the ADD block accounts for both xa ≥ xb
and xa < xb cases.
Similarly, for the Y coordinates we use the SUB
and INV blocks to compute the absolute difference
in 1′s complement form. To account for the case when
yl+1 = 1, we use an INC block that adds the value of
the bit yl+1 to the output of the ADD block. The INC
TABLE 3
Circuit size for Manhattan distance calculation.
Block #XOR gates #AND gates
2× SUB 2× 4l 2× l
2× INV 2× l 0
ADD 4l l
INC l + 1 l
T otal 15l + 1 4l
TABLE 4
Circuit size of 1 Min block.
Block #XOR gates #AND gates
CMP 3(l + 1) l + 1
MUXmin 2(l + 1) l + 1
MUXindex 2Lind Lind
Total 5(l + 1) + 2Lind 2(l+ 1) + Lind
block is composed of l half-adder(HA) blocks, where
each HA block, in turn, is composed of 1 XOR and
1 AND gate.
The output of the INC block represents the (l+ 1)-
bit Manhattan distance between (xa, ya) and (xb, yb).
Using the circuit design of Figure 10 and Figure 11,
a list of distances between the location of the mobile
client and any number (L) of ATM locations can be
computed. Table 3 shows that our Boolean circuit
for computing the Manhattan distance between two
points has a total of (15l+1) XOR gates and 4l AND
gates.
Note: In a more direct alternative to compute Man-
hattan distance, we may first find min(xa, xb) and
max(xa, xb), and always subtract min(xa, xb) from
max(xa, xb) (similarly for the Y coordinates). While
this approach would eliminate INV and INC blocks,
it however would require the use of two comparator
and conditional swap blocks [18], which together
introduce 12l new XOR gates and 4l AND gates.
Consequently, this alternative approach to compute
Manhattan distance would require a total of 24l XOR
gates and 7l AND gates. Thus, in comparison to
this more direct alternative, our design shown above
in Figure 10 and Figure 11 requires a significantly
smaller number of (15l+ 1) XOR and 4l AND gates.
6.2 Circuit for Computing the Nearest ATM
Following the computation of distance between the
mobile client and L ATM locations, it is necessary
to find the nearest ATM, along with its distance. We
use the approach of Kolesnikov et al. [19] to find the
minimum value and its index, given a list of values.
Kolesnikov et al. have designed a MIN block to find
the minimum of two input values – it uses the result of
a comparator to multiplex the minimum value, as well
as the corresponding index as shown in Figure 12.
Table 4 shows the size of the circuit that computes
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Fig. 12. Finding minimum value and index.
TABLE 5
Complete circuit size for nearest ATM. DIST (L)
denotes distance to L locations. T (MIN) denotes the
tree of MIN blocks.
Block #XOR gates #AND gates
DIST (L) v1 = (15l + 1)L v3 = 4lL
T (MIN) v2 = [5(l + 1) + 2 v4 = [2(l + 1)+
Lind]× (L− 1) Lind]× (L− 1)
Total v1 + v2 v3 + v4
Application 2596 854
the minimum of two values, along with its index.
In our privacy preserving application, each distance
is an (l + 1) = 11 + 1 = 12-bit number, and each
index that identifies an ATM using its East and South
coordinates is an Lind = 2l = 22-bit number.
Given L values and their indices, using (L−1) MIN
blocks organized as a tree, the minimum value and the
corresponding index are propagated from the leaves
to the root. Figure 12 shows the computation of the
minimum of 4 input values, D1, D2, D3, D4, and the
corresponding index, imin(D1,D2,D3,D4), as an example.
Table 5 shows the number of XOR and AND gates
in the complete circuit that computes the nearest ATM
location. It shows that in our privacy preserving ap-
plication of finding the nearest Chase or Wells Fargo
ATM in Salt Lake City, the circuit has a total of 2596
XOR and 854 AND gates.
6.3 Server-side and Client-side Cost
Figure 13 shows the network traffic as a function of
the number of servers (n) involved in the creation
of the garbled circuit that can compute the nearest
ATM and the corresponding distance in a privacy
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Fig. 13. Server-side network traffic to construct the
garbled circuit for determining the nearest ATM.
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Fig. 14. Client-side cost to determine the nearest ATM.
preserving manner. For example, with n = 4 servers,
the servers exchange a total of 126 GB of information
to create the garbled circuit. This result demonstrates
the feasibility of our approach for performing real-
world privacy-preserving computations.
In order to facilitate the creation of the garbled
circuit, and for the evaluation, the mobile client sends
– (i) the seed values to the n servers, and (ii) the gar-
bled values representing the coordinates of the input
location to the evaluator. Since the ATM locations are
publicly known, they are assumed to be hard-coded
in the garbled circuit. i.e., the client is not required to
transmit the ATM locations to the servers.
Figure 14 shows the total number of bits gener-
ated by the client to delegate the privacy preserving
computation of the nearest ATM. To preserve location
privacy, the client exchanges a very small amount of
information with the servers – less than 60 kilo bits,
with n = 4 servers, for example. Comparing Figure 13
and Figure 14, we note that the client-side cost grows
much slowly with the number of servers, in comparison to
the server-side cost.
7 RELATED WORK
Homomorphic encryption is an approach that enables
performing computations directly on the encrypted
data, without requiring private decryption keys. For
example, in the RSA public key system, the product
of two ciphertext messages produces a ciphertext
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corresponding to the product of the underlying plain
text messages [26]. Domingo-Ferrer et al. [10] present
a homomorphic scheme that represents ciphertext as
polynomials, allowing both addition and multiplica-
tion operations on the underlying plain text; however,
in this scheme, multiplication operations drastically
increase the size of the cipher text. Recently, fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes (e.g., Gentry
et al. [13]) have been proposed, which enable per-
forming any arbitrary computation on encrypted data.
However, FHE schemes are currently impractical for
cloud computing applications due to extremely large
cipher text size (Section 5.5).
Yao’s garbled circuits have been primarily used
in conjunction with oblivious transfer protocols for
secure two-party computation [30], [31], [20]. Lindell
et al. [21] present an excellent survey of secure mul-
tiparty computation, along with numerous potential
applications, such as privacy preserving data mining,
private set intersection, electronic voting and elec-
tronic auction. A number of secure two-party and
multiparty computation systems have been built over
the years (e.g., [17], [22], [4]). Note that in secure
multiparty computation systems multiple parties hold
private inputs and receive the result of the computa-
tion; however, in a secure cloud computing system,
such as ours, while multiple parties participate in
the creation of garbled circuits, only the client holds
private inputs and obtains the result of the computa-
tion in garbled form. In our work, we adapt secure
multiparty computation protocols [14], [15], [3], [27],
as we have described in Section 4.2, for building
a secure and verifiable cloud computing for mobile
systems.
Some existing works [7], [9] use arithmetic circuits
for performing homomorphic addition and multipli-
cation operations. However, Boolean circuits are suf-
ficient for our purpose of creating the garbled table
entries as it only involves simple binary operations
such as XOR and AND (Section 4.1.1). Additionally,
Boolean circuits are more efficient than arithmetic
circuits for homomorphic comparison of numbers,
which we have used abundantly in our privacy pre-
serving search application (Section 6), since com-
parison using an arithmetic circuit involves a large
number of multiplications and communication rounds
among the participants [7], [9].
Twin clouds [6] is a secure cloud computing ar-
chitecture, in which the client uses a private cloud
for creating garbled circuits and a public commodity
cloud for evaluating them. Our solution, on the other
hand, employs multiple public cloud servers for creat-
ing as well as evaluating the garbled circuits. In other
words, our solution obviates the requirement of private
cloud servers. Furthermore, in twin clouds, the privacy of
the client data is lost if the evaluator colludes with the
sole/only server that constructs the garbled circuit. In our
work, on the other hand, the use of multiple servers for
construction of garbled circuits offers greater resistance to
collusion (Section 2).
While FHE schemes currently remain impractical,
they, however, offer interesting constructions, such as
reusable garbled circuits [16] and verifiable comput-
ing capabilities that permit a client to verify whether
an untrusted server has actually performed the re-
quested computation [12]. In our proposed system, we
enable the client to efficiently verify whether an untrusted
server has actually evaluated the garbled circuit, without
relying on any FHE scheme.
Naehrig et al. [23] present an implementation of a
“somewhat” homomorphic encryption scheme, which
is capable of computing simple statistics such as
mean, standard deviation and regression, which re-
quire only addition operations, and a very few mul-
tiplication operations. Another recent work (P4P [11])
provides privacy preservation for computations in-
volving summations only. In comparison, our scheme,
which is based on Yao’s garbled circuits, is not limited
to computation of simple statistics or summations
only; i.e., our scheme is more generic, and can perform
any arbitrary computation.
Carter et al. [8] have proposed an atypical secure
two party computation system with three partici-
pants: Alice, Bob and a Proxy. In their work, Bob is a
webserver that creates garbled circuits, and Alice is a
mobile device that delegates the task of evaluating
the garbled circuits to the Proxy, which is a cloud
server. We note that the computation and adversary
models in Carter et al.’s work are very different
from that of our work. First, in their work, being
a secure two party computation system, both Alice
and Bob provide private inputs for the computation
that they wish to perform jointly; however, in our
secure cloud computing model, only one party, i.e.,
the mobile client, provides inputs and obtains result
of the computation in garbled form. Second, Cartel
et al.’s scheme requires that neither Alice nor Bob
can collude with the Proxy; in a sharp contrast, our
method preserves the privacy of the client data even
if the evaluating server colludes with all but one of
the cloud servers that participated in the creation of
the garbled circuit.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We proposed a novel secure and verifiable cloud com-
puting for mobile system using multiple servers. Our
method combines the secure multiparty computation
protocol of Goldreich et al. and the garbled circuit
design of Beaver et al. with the cryptographically
secure pseudorandom number generation method of
Blum et al. Our method preserves the privacy of the
mobile client’s inputs and the results of the compu-
tation, even if the evaluator colludes with all but one
of the servers that participated in the creation of the
garbled circuit. Further, our method can efficiently de-
tect a cheating evaluator that returns arbitrary values
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CLOUD COMPUTING, VOL. X, NO. X, JANUARY 20XX 15
as output without performing any computation. We
presented an analysis of the server-side and client-
side complexity of our system. Using real-world data,
we evaluated our system for a privacy preserving
search application that locates the nearest bank/ATM
from the mobile client. We evaluated the time taken
to construct and evaluate a garbled circuit for varying
number of servers, and demonstrated the feasibility of
our proposed approach.
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